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Abstract
APPROXIMATE DISASSEMBLY USING DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
by Abhishek Shah
Most commercial anti-virus software uses signature based techniques to detect whether a file
is infected by a virus or not. However, signature based detection systems are unable to detect
metamorphic viruses, since such viruses change their internal structure from generation to
generation. Previous work has shown that hidden Markov models (HMMs) can be used to
detect metamorphic viruses. In this technique, the code is disassembled and the resulting
opcode sequences are used for training and detection. Due to the disassembly step, this
process is not efficient enough to use when a decision has to be made in real time.

In this project, we explore whether dynamic programming can be used to speed up the process
of disassembling, with minimal loss of accuracy. Dynamic programming is generally used to
solve problems having two key attributes: optimal substructure and overlapping sub problems.
During each iteration our algorithm reads part of the input stream from the executable file and
determines assembly instructions, thus dividing problems into sub problems.

We have created a score matrix representing digraphs of the most common opcode
instructions and we have implanted a dynamic program based on this scoring matrix. For
various file sizes, we determine the time taken by our dynamic program and we show that our
approach is significantly faster than a standard disassembler (OllyDbg). Finally, we analyze the
accuracy of our results.
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APPROXIMATE DISASSEMBLY
USING DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING
1.

Introduction
Viruses are among the most challenging problems in computer security. According to
Cohen [12], a computer virus is a program that disrupts the normal functioning of a system
by modifying the underlying programs or by using resources without the consent of the
user. A virus can cause harm to a host machine or a system. The effect of malware can be as
simple as displaying a threatening message, or as complex as subtlety changing the
functionality of an important program. For example, a recent virus named Stuxnet was
identified as code that could reprogram programmable logic control software to give an
attached nuclear controller new instructions [13].

To detect viruses, most anti-virus software uses signature based techniques. A signature
generally consists of binary data that represent the file [18]. To avoid signature based
detection, virus writers have developed sophisticated methods, including polymorphic
viruses, oligomorphic viruses, and metamorphic viruses [2]. Metamorphic viruses, which
are, arguably, the most dangerous of all, change their structure or signature each time they
propagate, without changing the functionality of the virus.

Research currently being conducted in the field of metamorphic virus detection includes:
[1]. Hidden Markov models (HMMs) have proved to be an effective technique for detecting
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metamorphic viruses [4] and [19]. One disadvantage of using HMMs is that an executable
file has to be disassembled and its opcode sequence extracted before it can be scored, and
this process of disassembling can be time consuming [16]. In this paper, we present a fast
approach to disassembly, using dynamic programming. In dynamic programming a complex
problem is divided into smaller problems in recursive manner [8]. The results of the solved
smaller problems are stored for later reference.

The aim of this project is to use dynamic programming to reduce the time required to
disassemble executable files. First, the .text section, which contains program code, is
extracted from the executable file. We then determine an opcode sequence by scoring
possible paths based on pre-computed statistics obtained by disassembling a large number
of executable files.

This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we provide background information about
viruses and their types and we discuss the techniques used to generate metamorphic
viruses. Section 3 describes the Hidden Markov Model. Section 4 describes how HMMs can
be used to detect metamorphic viruses. Section 5 describes different methods for
disassembling an executable file and discusses Intel Architecture instruction format. Section
6 discusses dynamic programming in general. Section 7 explains our algorithm and how it
can be used to accurately determine assembly code from an executable file. Section 8
provides test results for the speed and accuracy of our technique, for a wide variety of file
sizes. Section 9 presents our conclusions and suggestions for future work.
2

2.

Computer Viruses
A computer virus is a malicious program which infects a host system without the consent of
the user. It is responsible for altering the default system behavior. Computer viruses find
executable files and infect them by copying code known as payload into them. Finally the
virus will determine if the desired condition, like number of infections, is met [1]. Anti-virus
software detects the presence of viruses in the system and removes them. Most anti-virus
programs use signature based detection. Various methods are used to avoid signature
based detection, which we will discuss in the next section.

According to [2] and [3], there are five types of viruses: simple, encrypted, oligomorphic,
polymorphic, and metamorphic.

2.1. Simple Viruses
A simple virus replicates itself while infecting files and does not use sophisticated methods
to hide itself from detection. When a program infected by this type of virus is opened; the
virus alters the default behavior of the computer and replicates itself to other files. Each
virus of this type has a specific signature. This makes it very easy for anti-virus software to
detect and remove them.

2.2. Encrypted Viruses
Encrypted viruses were invented to hide the malicious functionality. The body of this virus
consists of constant decryptor and encrypted virus body. The malicious intent is hidden in
3

the encrypted body of the virus. During infection, the decryptor first decrypts the encrypted
body and thereafter spreads the infection. These viruses can be easily detected because
they use common decryptors. The anti-virus software can check the signature of the
decryptor to detect these types of viruses.

2.3. Oligomorphic Viruses
Oligomorphic virus is an improved version of the encrypted virus. In this type of virus the
decryptor is changed each time during propagation. However, there is a limited number of
forms in which the decryptor can exist. According to [2], Win95/Memorial had the ability to
build 96 different decryptor patterns. Thus, signature based detection technique can still be
used if all of the different flavors of decryptor are included. Another technique used to
detect these viruses is dynamic decryption of encrypted virus, after which signature based
detection techniques can be used.

2.4. Polymorphic Viruses
Polymorphic virus is capable of creating an infinite number of decryptors after each
infection. It consists of a decryptor, a mutation engine, and a virus body. The mutation
engine changes the decryptor, which thwarts detection by signature based antivirus
software. However, polymorphic viruses can be detected by first using dynamic decryption
and then using signature based techniques on the unencrypted body. Figure 1 shows
different body structures of same polymorphic virus.

4

Figure 1: Generations of Polymorphic Virus [2]

2.5. Metamorphic Viruses
Unlike other kinds of viruses, metamorphic viruses do not have a decryptor, a mutation
engine, or an encrypted virus body. Metamorphic viruses change their form each time they
spread infection while keeping their functionality intact. In this way they avoid detection
using signature based techniques commonly employed by anti-virus software. Code
obfuscation techniques are used by metamorphic viruses to change body structure as
shown in Figure 2.

5

Figure 2: Virus Body of Different Metamorphic Virus [2]

2.5.1. Different Techniques of Metamorphism

According to [1], various types of techniques are used by metamorphic viruses in order to
avoid detection. Metamorphic virus might use one or more of the following techniques.

2.5.1.1.

Garbage Code Insertion

Garbage code insertion technique is a simple technique used to generate metamorphic
virus. In this technique some code is inserted that does not change the default functionality
of the virus. A simple example is to insert a for loop which does not do anything. The code
6

inserted is called garbage since it does not do anything useful. The use of this technique
avoids signature based detection used by the anti-virus software.

2.5.1.2.

Register Usage Exchange

The register usage exchange technique uses different registers in different generations of
virus. The code and functionality remain unchanged in this technique. Here the complexity
of code is not very high. Anti-virus software which does not support wild card string
matching cannot detect virus generated by this technique.

2.5.1.3.

Permutation Technique

The permutation technique divides the code into many fragments and then rearranges it in
different permutations from generation to generation. Jump instructions are used to
connect these fragments. However, the control flow during each generation remains the
same. If the code is divided into n fragments, then there is a possibility of generating n!
metamorphic virus.

2.5.1.4.

Insertion of Jump Instruction

Metamorphic viruses sometimes use jump instructions to generate different body
structures. The jump instruction is removed or inserted at random locations, and it points to
the next instruction within the virus code. This type of virus does not generate a constant
body, even in memory, and they are not possible to detect using wild card string matching.
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2.5.1.5.

Instruction Replacement

Another method used by metamorphic virus is the replacement of the instructions which
match the functionality. If there are two instructions which have the same functionality but
different opcode, then this technique can be used by metamorphic viruses to avoid
detection. For example “AND ESI, ESI” can be replaced by “TEST ESI, ESI” or vice versa, since
both have the same functionality. Another example is to use different versions of
conditional jump instructions and modify the code accordingly.

2.5.1.6.

Host Code Mutation

The host code mutation technique targets different executable files on the host computer
during each generation. This produces new viruses during each generation. Since it infects
different executable files, it is impossible to have a common disinfection technique [20].

2.5.1.7.

Code Integration

Code integration is a sophisticated technique used by metamorphic virus to generate new
body structure during each generation. In this technique, the virus first decompiles the
executable file, divides the code into different fragments, inserts virus code, and compiles
the entire code again to generate new executable code. This makes it hard to detect the
virus, and even more difficult to repair the executable [2].
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3.

Hidden Markov Model (HMM)
A Hidden Markov Model is a statistical Markov model in which the hidden states are used to
produce the observation state. A Markov model determines the current state on the basis
of the previous state. In a Hidden Markov Model the states are invisible to the user.
However, observation states are visible. Each observation state depends on the hidden
states. According to [7], we can use the following notation to represent HMM
Let
T = length of the observation sequence
N =number of states in the model
M =number of observation symbols
Q = {q0, q1, . . . , qN−1} = states of the Markov process
V = {0, 1, . . . , M − 1} = all possible observations
A = state transition probabilities
B = observation probability matrix
π = initial state distribution
O = (O0, O1, . . . , OT−1) = observation sequence
Figure 3 shows a Hidden Markov Model where each Markov process Xi [except X0] is
generated by taking into consideration the previous Markov process and A matrix, which
represents state transition probabilities. The user can only see the observation sequence O.
Each observation state is produced by Hidden Markov Process Xi and B matrix, which
represents the observation probability matrix.

9

Figure 3: Hidden Markov Model [7]

HMM is used in applications such as speech recognition, cryptanalysis, gene prediction, etc.
where the output depends on states which are not observable.
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4.

HMM for Metamorphic Virus Detection
According to [4], the HMM model can be used to detect metamorphic viruses that belong to
the same family. In this method, HMM is first trained by giving assembly code of various
metamorphic virus files as input. All the executable files of the same metamorphic virus
family are disassembled, and opcode are extracted. A disassembler, such as OllyDbg, is used
for disassembling the exe file. These opcode are concatenated to form a long sequence.
Each of these sequences is given as input to the HMM model and thus, at the end of the
process, the HMM model represents a statistical model of the virus family. Figure 4 shows
the entire process of detecting metamorphic viruses with the help of HMM model.

Trained HMM
Model
(determines whether
virus file or not)

Dissassembler
(OllyDbg)
Unknown.exe file

Assembly-code file

Figure 4: Process for Detecting Metamorphic Virus

The HMM is tested against two types of files: one type belongs to the same metamorphic
virus family and other type is a non-virus program or a virus file of some other family. The
HMM should give a high score for files that belong to the same metamorphic virus family
for which we trained our HMM. However, the HMM should give a low score for any nonvirus program or virus file of some other family [4].
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However, there is one problem with the above method. One has to disassemble the entire
executable file in order to determine whether it is a virus file or not. The process of
disassembly takes a long time. For example, it would take 18 sec on average to disassemble
a 3.6MB executable file. This can be optimized by using dynamic programming, which is
faster than disassemblers such as OllyDbg. Later, we present our algorithm, which produces
assembly code at a faster rate than OllyDbg and with a great deal of accuracy. The following
section explains the compilation and reverse engineering process.
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5.

Technical Details of Disassembly
In this section, we discuss the process of converting source code into executable and the
process of converting executable file into assembly code. We also discuss the types of
disassembly and Intel instruction format.

5.1. Compilation
A computer programmer writes a program in high level language like C, C++, etc. The source
code is converted into assembly code and finally to machine code (executable file) which is
platform-dependent. This process is known as compilation. Disassembly is the process of
converting machine code into assembly code. The process of converting assembly code
back to source code is known as decompilation. Figure 5 shows the entire process.

Figure 5: Compilation and Reverse Engineering [5]
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5.2. Disassembly
The executable file contains a header, a section table, and different sections such as text,
data, relocation section, etc. [6]. In addition, it contains information about the size of the
executable file, location and size of each section, a stub program that will be executed if the
program is run on MS-DOS (without Windows), etc. Converting this executable file (which
the machine understands) into a file containing assembly code that a human being can
understand is called disassembly.

There are two types of disassembly: static disassembly and dynamic disassembly. In static
disassembly, the disassembler analyses the entire executable file and converts it into
assembly code. In dynamic disassembly, the disassembler analyses only a few of the
instructions which are to be executed and converted into assembly code. OllyDbg, when
used without a debugger, is an example of static disassembly, however when it is used with
debugger it is an example of dynamic disassembly. In static disassembly, the speed of
disassembly is directly proportional to the size of executable file. However, in dynamic
disassembly the size of the executable file does not affect the speed of disassembly. In this
project we focus on static disassembly.
5.2.1. Types of Static Disassembly

There are three approaches used in static disassembly. They are linear sweep, recursive
traversal, and hybrid disassembly.

14

5.2.1.1.

Linear Sweep

In linear sweep the disassembler first finds the starting address of the program. After
finding that address, the disassembler starts converting machine code into assembly code
one by one. The linear sweep method does not take into consideration the control flow of
executable program. objdump, part of GNU Binutils, is an example of a linear sweep
disassembler [21]. The problem with this approach is that errors are not detected until an
unknown machine code is encountered. Many viruses use special techniques to confuse
linear sweep disassemblers.
5.2.1.2.

Recursive Traversal

Unlike linear sweep, recursive traversal takes into account control flow of the program
during disassembly of machine code into assembly code. This method starts disassembling
the executable file and whenever it encounters jump instructions it follows that address and
continues the process. When a conditional jump is encountered it takes into consideration
both possible paths and generates assembly code. The main advantage of this method is
that it is able to bypass the junk code in the executable code. According to [14] and [22],
OllyDbg and IDA Pro use recursive traversal method for disassembling executable files.
5.2.1.3.

Hybrid Disassembly

Both the linear sweep and recursive traversal methods described above sometimes do not
disassemble the executable file correctly. This problem can be overcome by using a hybrid
disassembly method. In hybrid disassembly method first the executable file is disassembled
15

using linear sweep and then this disassembled code is verified using recursive traversal. If
the verification passes then no change is made but if verification fails then that code is
removed from subsequent optimization. The problematic code is inserted in the program
after optimization has been applied to the remaining part of program. This approach will
require updating the addresses within the machine code [11].

5.3. Intel Architecture Instruction Format
Figure 6 shows Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Instruction Format. Each instruction consists
of optional instruction prefixes, opcode bytes, the ModR/M byte and the SIB (Scale-IndexBase) byte, a displacement, and an immediate data field.

Figure 6: Intel 64 and IA-32 Architectures Instruction Format [10]

Instruction Prefixes
The instruction prefix is an optional part of instruction format and is divided into four
groups. Each instruction can have at the most one prefix code from each group.
Group 1
F0H is used as lock prefix, F2H is used for encoding REPNE/REPNZ and F3 is used for
encoding REP/REPE/REPZ
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Group 2
2EH is used as CS segment override prefix, 36H is used as SS segment override prefix, 3EH is
used as DS segment override prefix, 26H is used as ES segment override prefix, 64H is used
as FS segment override prefix, 65H is used as GS segment override prefix. 2EH is used for
branch not taken; 3EH is used for branch taken.
Group 3
66H is used as operand-size override prefix.
Group 4
67H is used as address-size override prefix.
Opcode
The opcode can be 1, 2 or 3 bytes in length. Opcode specifies the operation to be
performed by the instruction. Sometimes 3 extra bits of opcode field are stored in ModR/M
byte. The opcode field contains mandatory prefix, sign extension, displacement size, and
register encoding.
ModR/M and SIB Bytes
ModR/M is of one byte. It contains information about the addressing mode and the
registers used by the instruction. It consists of mod field, reg/opcode field and r/m field.
SIB byte which follows ModR/M byte stands for Scale Index Base. It contains scale field
which specifies factor, index field which specify particular index register and base field
which specify particular base register. Following formula is used for calculating SIB value.
SIB value = (INDEX * 2^SCALE) + BASE
Displacement and Immediate Bytes
17

A displacement which follows optional SIB byte can be of 1, 2 or 4 bytes in length. The size
of displacement is decided by Mod field.
Immediate field which follows displacement byte can be 1, 2 or 4 bytes in length. For
instruction ADD BX, 0xFFFF the immediate field value is 0xFFFF.

Example
OR EAX, [ECX + EDX*2 + 508090B0h]
The above instruction does OR operation and is represented in the assembly code. In Table
1, we represent the same in the binary form.

Opcode

ModM/R

SIB

Displacement

00001011

10000100

01010001

10110000 10010000 10000000
01010000

Table 1: Binary Representation of OR Instruction

In the next section we discuss in detail dynamic programming and two different ways in
which it can be implemented.
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6.

Dynamic Programming
Dynamic programming is an efficient method for solving problems that can be divided into
smaller problems and which exhibit properties of overlapping sub problems. This method is
usually used to solve search and optimization problems. Like divide and conquer method,
the highly complex problems are divided into sub problems. However unlike divide and
conquer, the dynamic programming takes advantage of overlapping sub problems. The
method first solves the sub problems; stores the results of the sub problems, and use the
results to solve more complex problems. For overlapping sub problems, dynamic
programming is much better than divide and conquer since it only needs to solve each
problem once.

Dynamic programming can be implemented in either of two ways: top down approach or
bottom up approach [23].

6.1. Top Down Approach
This approach is used when we can apply recursion to solve the bigger problem. In top
down approach we first try to look up and see if the problem is already solved. If it is not
solved; we first solve it and store the result. If the problem is already solved we use the precomputed result and solve the problem.

19

6.2. Bottom Up Approach
In this approach, we first divide the problem into sub problems recursively. Then we try to
solve sub problems and store results into a table. We use the solutions of these sub
problems to solve the bigger problem.

In the next section, we explain a simple problem and how it can be solved using dynamic
programming.

6.3. Example
Consider the problem of finding the nth Fibonacci number where n is a whole number. The
initial condition of the algorithm is fibo(0)=0 and fibo(1)=1. For any n, Fibonacci number is
found by using equation fibo(n)=fibo(n-1)+fibo(n-2). The simple recursive implementation is
shown in Figure 7.

Figure 7: Finding Fibonacci Numbers Recursively

Here the problem at each stage is divided into smaller sub problems until it can no longer
be divided. Smaller sub problems are solved and combined together to get solutions to the
20

bigger problem. In general, the problem of calculating fib(n) depends on solving 2 sub
problems: fib(n-1) and fib(n-2). The general solution tree for fibo(4) is shown in Figure 8.

Figure 8: Solution Tree for Fibonacci Series

As shown in Figure 8, there is one sub problem that is calculated more than once. For
example fibo(2) is calculated 2 times. We can optimize this problem by using dynamic
programming. Consider the algorithm shown in Figure 9.

Figure 9: Finding Fibonacci Numbers by Dynamic Programming
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As shown in Figure 9, the same problem can be solved using dynamic programming. Since
this problem exhibits the property of optimal substructure, first we divide the bigger
problem into smaller problems. If we solve the smaller sub problem; we store the result.
This result is later used if the same problem is encountered again. Since the problem of
finding fibonacci number exhibits properties of optimal substructure and overlapping sub
problems, we can use dynamic programming to solve it efficiently. In Big O notation, the
naive recursion implementation takes exponential time while dynamic programming takes
O(n) time. We use dynamic programming in our algorithm which is discussed in the next
section.

22

7. Our Algorithm
The aim of our project is to develop a program that can accurately predict assembly code
from executable files. We use dynamic programming to predict assembly code from
executable files. We took 50 .exe files from Cygwin folder, which had a size range from
300KB to 662KB. The size range was selected randomly. All these files were opened in
OllyDbg individually and the .text section of each .exe file was extracted. We take only the
.text section since it contains the program code. The text section was saved individually into
50 different .txt files. The name of the text file was kept the same as the exe file name. Each
of the files was given as an input to the program, which generated a 2-dimensional table
representing the count of pair of instructions. The first row and first column consisted of 14
instructions. All the other cells consisted of integer values representing the number of times
instructions in row followed by instructions in column appeared.
MOV

NOP

MOV

1344183 1765

NOP

7582

...

...

111344

Table 2: Matrix of Instruction Occurrences

As shown in Table 2, the number of times MOV instruction occurs and a consecutive MOV
instruction occurs is 1344183. Similarly the number of times NOP instruction occurs and
another MOV instruction occurs is 7582. The most frequently occurring instructions in the
.text section of the executable file were MOV, NOP, CAL, LEA, PUS, POP, JMP, TES, SUB,
23

CMP, JE, JNZ, ADD and RET. Hence this project only takes these 14 instructions in
consideration. Appendix A shows the matrix. Another program took a matrix of 50 files as
input and added them all; giving a single large matrix. After addition, probability of each cell
in the matrix was calculated and a new matrix was generated. The formula used was (value
of a particular cell) / (Total value of all cells). It was then converted into odds using formula
(p) / (1-p). The logarithmic odd for each cell was calculated. The reason we decided to take
logarithmic odd instead of probability was that we can sum the log odds instead of trying to
multiply probabilities, which might give underflow. Appendix B shows the final log odd
matrix. The process described above is shown in Figure 10. It is important to notice that this
process is performed only once for the generation of statistical data. Later we use the
output of this process to determine assembly code instructions from executable file.

24

50 .exe files from cygwin folder

Logarithmic odd
calculation
program

Parsing
Program

OllyDbg
Disassembler

Matrix.txt file containing
instruction pair count
50 .txt files containing text section

LogMatrix.txt file containing
logarithmic odd value

Figure 10: Process Used for Matrix Generation

We used dynamic programming to solve the problem of finding assembly instructions from
the executable file without disassembling it. First we extracted the .text section of
executable files. We use the program mentioned in [22] for extraction of .text section
whose output is a text file. The .text section that was originally in binary form is converted
to a hexadecimal representation. Figure 11 shows part of the output of this program.
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Figure 11: Example .text Section of an Executable File

We then read the file containing hex codes and get the input stream. The input stream is
then supplied to our main program. With the help of the matrix shown in Appendix B, our
main program tries to determine the assembly instruction using dynamic programming. This
process is shown in Figure 12.
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.text section
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with
approximate
instruction

Figure 12: Using Our Algorithm for Generating Assembly Code from Executable File

During each iteration, the algorithm parses the input stream of length 2 or 4 and maintains
2 tables with the following information.


Score – This column contains a decimal value which is updated after parsing each of
the instructions. We use the table shown in Appendix B to update the score.



Instruction Opcode – This column contains opcode of each instruction. The opcode
are generated by refereeing [10]. The opcode is represented in hexadecimal format.
For example instruction MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EDX],AL in the executable file is
represented as 8802H where 88H is opcode while 02H is operand. The column
keeps track of the opcode of instruction. Thus, for the above example, we store 88H.



Length of instruction – This column contains all the possible lengths of the
instruction. MOV instruction whose opcode is 89H can be of length 4, 6, 8, 12 or 14.
We determined the length by looking at Intel® 64 and IA-32 Architectures Software
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Developer's Manual Volume 2A: Instruction Set Reference, A-M and Intel® 64 and IA32 Architectures Software Developer's Manual Volume 2B: Instruction Set
Reference, N-Z [10]. For example consider instruction MOV EBP,ESP which is
represented as 89E5 while instruction MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],EAX is
represented as 890424 in the executable file. The first instruction is of length 4 while
later instruction is of length 6. We capture this information in this column.


Flag to know if set or not-set – We use this flag to track if that opcode has occurred
or not. This will help in building the solution path.



Pointer for current location of input string – This column is initially set to 0. It keeps
track of the location where next input stream should be parsed.



Instruction name – This column represents the name of the instruction. We use 3
letters to represent each instruction uniquely. For example move instruction is
represented as “MOV”; push instruction is represented as “PUS”.

7.1.

Sample Input Stream

Consider stream 5589E583EC18895DF88B5508....... as input to our algorithm. This is the
beginning part of the .text section of an executable file. The program first reads 55H from
the input stream. It references the lookup table and finds that it is a PUSH instruction and of
length 2. It now moves the pointer and reads the next data. Thus it reads 89H. From the
lookup table the algorithm knows that it can represent opcode of a MOV instruction. The
length can be 2,4,6,10,12 excluding 89H. This is represented in Figure 13 by the value
between each node. The algorithm keeps track of the score between 2 nodes. Moreover the
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algorithm looks up in the matrix shown in Appendix B and finds that the logarithmic odd
value of instruction MOV occurs after instruction PUSH is -3.91. This value is added to the
path [initial value of the path is assumed to be 0] as shown in the Figure 13. In this way
node numbers 2,3,4,5 and 6 are added to the possible solutions. For node number 2, the
algorithm skips E5H (part of the input 5589E5...) since the operand length is 2 and thus the
next input stream would be 83. Since it is 83H it grabs 2 more from input and hence it is
83EC which is opcode for SUB instruction. From the lookup table in Appendix B the value of
SUB instruction occurring after MOV is -4.17. This value is added to -3.91 and the path value
becomes -8.08. In a similar fashion, the algorithm continues to process the input stream and
builds the possible path. In the end, the algorithm considers all the paths with large
numbers of nodes and finds the value that is closest to 0.
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Input Stream = 5589E583EC18895DF88B5508.....
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Figure 13: Solution by Our Algorithm

In this example, the nodes in the end i.e. 8BH have value -12.82 while 55H has -16.58. The
algorithm selects the best path that is closest to 0. In our example, the path shown in red in
Figure 14 is selected. Hence the expected instructions are PUSH, MOV, SUB, MOV, MOV.
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Input Stream = 5589E583EC18895DF88B5508.....
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Figure 14: Solution Path
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MOV

8. Test and Results
In this section, we discuss the tests we conducted to determine the speed and accuracy of
our algorithm and its results.

8.1. Speed Test
The tests were performed on a Window 7 Home Premium, 64 bit operating system, Intel
Core 2 Duo T6500 processor, 2.1GHz and 4GB RAM. The tests were conducted on 65
executable files with average file sizes ranging from 250KB to 3670KB. For each file, we
measured the time taken to disassemble by a standard disassembler like OllyDbg v1.10 and
also by our program.
Average File Size Range: 250KB to 1050KB
In this test, the total number of files is 20 and the average file size ranges from 250KB to
1050KB. The average time taken by our program for this file range to generate instructions
is 1500 milliseconds. The average time taken by OllyDbg to disassemble the files is 1775
milliseconds. The time taken by OllyDbg is 18% more than the time taken by our program.
For only some files of average size 1050KB the time taken by OllyDbg is slightly less than our
algorithm, which might be due to a slight error in the calculation of time taken to
disassemble through OllyDbg. The results of this test are shown in Figure 15.
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Figure 15: Time Comparison (250KB to 1050KB)

Average Files Size Range: 1210KB to 1850KB
In this test, the total number of files is 20 and the average file size ranges from 1210KB to
1850KB. The average time taken by our program to generate the instructions is 3963
milliseconds. The average time taken by OllyDbg to disassemble the files is 4750
milliseconds. The time taken by OllyDbg is 20% more than the time taken by our program.
The results of this test are shown in Figure 16.
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Figure 16: Time Comparison (1210KB to 1850KB)

Average File Size Range: 2455KB to 3670KB
In this test, the total number of files is 25 and the average file size ranges from 2455KB to
3670KB. The average time taken by our program to generate the instructions is 9588
milliseconds. The average time taken by OllyDbg to disassemble the files is 12800
milliseconds. The time taken by OllyDbg is 33% more than the time taken by our program.
The results of this test are shown in Figure 17.
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Figure 17: Time Comparison (2455KB to 3670KB)

Considering all the files of different sizes, the average time taken by our program is 5370
milliseconds, while that by OllyDbg is 6930 milliseconds. From Figure 18 it is clear that as
average file size increases, the time taken by our program increases linearly, since we use
dynamic programming in our solution.
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Figure 18: Average Time Comparison
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8.2. Accuracy Test
In this section, we measure the accuracy of our program. First the executable file is opened
in OllyDbg. The .text section of the executable file is extracted and copied in the text file.
Later the executable file is supplied to our system, which first extracts the .text section and
then determines the assembly instructions. We then compare the output from our
algorithm to that from OllyDbg. We used Needleman–Wunsch algorithm [27] for the output
comparison. This algorithm is generally used for in bioinformatics to align protein or
nucleotide sequences and calculate the alignment score. We align the instructions first and
at the end calculate the alignment score, which is a summation of the score where a match
is found. If there is match to the instruction given by OllyDbg and our program, then we give
it a score of 1. If there is no match between the instruction given by OllyDbg and our
program, then we give it score of 0. We will not be taking gap penalty into account for our
program. We use the tool described in [25] to generate the alignment score. From this we
calculate accuracy. For example, if the number of instructions is 100 and alignment score is
93, then we conclude that the output given by our program is 93% accurate.

The same process is repeated for 55 executable files of different sizes and average accuracy
is calculated. Figure 19 shows the result of the experiment.
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Figure 19: Accuracy Test

From Figure 19 it is clear that our algorithm is able to predict the instructions with a high
level of accuracy. The average accuracy of our program is 83.75% when compared to the
output of OllyDbg.

We also tested our results using monographic frequency counts. In this method we first
disassembled the executable file using OllyDbg. Then we calculated the number of times
each of 14 instructions appeared in the executable file and calculated the percentage of
each instruction. Similarly we supplied the executable file to our program and calculated the
frequency of each of 14 instructions and its percentage. We then calculated a chi-square
statistic to determine if the distribution of observed frequencies obtained from our program
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differed from expected frequencies obtained from OllyDbg. The chi-square statistic is
calculated as:
χ2 = ∑ [ (O – E)2 / (E) ] ------ (1)

where

χ2 = chi-square statistic
O = Observed frequency
E = Expected frequency

Degree of freedom is given by (number of categories - 1). Using degree of freedom and the
chi-square distribution table given in Appendix C, we determine the chi-square test for
goodness of fit. We establish the null hypothesis, which is that the observed values are
close to the expected values. The alternative hypothesis is that they are not close to the
expected values. These hypotheses hold for all chi-square goodness of fit tests. If the
calculated chi-square is less than the value in the table, then the null hypothesis is accepted
and it is concluded that the predictions made were correct. Table 3 shows the calculation of
chi-square statistics for sample an executable file of size is 17KB.
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Instructions
MOV
NOP
CAL
LEA
PUS
POP
JMP
TES
SUB
CMP
JE
JNZ
ADD
RET
Total

% of Instructions
determined by Our Program
(Observed)
39
18
10
5
4
4
3
3
4
3
3
2
1
1
100

% of Instructions
determined by OllyDbg
(Expected)
41
18
8
5
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
1
100

(O — E)2/ E
0.097560976
0
0.5
0
0
0
0
0
0.333333333
0
0
0
0.5
0
1.430894309

Table 3: Tabulated results calculating chi-square statistic

From equation (1), chi-square statistic χ2 = 1.4309 and degree of freedom = (14-1) = 13.
Referring to the chi-square distribution table in Appendix C, the critical value for a chisquare at a probability level (alpha) = 0.05 and degree of freedom = 13 is 22.4. The critical
value is greater than χ2 and hence null hypothesis is accepted. Thus it passes the chi-square
test for goodness of fit.

However, one can argue that the chi-square statistic does not give correct results if the
frequencies are too low. Hence, in the above example we neglect instructions whose
frequencies of occurrence are less than 10%.
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Instructions
MOV
NOP
CAL

% of Instructions
determined by Our
Program (Observed)
39
18
10

% of Instructions
determined by OllyDbg
(Expected)
41
18
8

(O — E)2/ E
0.097560976
0
0.5

Table 4: Tabulated results calculating chi-square statistic ignoring low frequency

From equation (1), chi-square statistic χ2 = (0.0975 + 0 + 0.5) = 0.5975 and degree of
freedom = (3-1) =2.

Referring to the chi-square distribution table in Appendix C, the critical value for a chisquare at a probability level (alpha) = 0.05 and degree of freedom = 2 is 5.99. The critical
value is greater than χ2 and hence null hypothesis is accepted. Thus it passes the chi-square
test for goodness of fit. Since the test passes with and without considering low frequency,
we can conclude that instructions determined by our program match closely with the
instructions produced by Ollydbg.

We carried out the process described above i.e. with and without considering low frequency
counts for files of different sizes ranging from 250 KB to 3670 KB. For all the files, it passes
the chi-square test for goodness of fit taking alpha value as 0.05 which means that the
output obtained from OllyDbg is statistically the same as the output obtained from our
program.
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9. Conclusions and Future Work
We implemented an algorithm to determine assembly instructions from an executable file.
We first collected statistical data of the occurrence of one particular instruction after
another by disassembling executable files from Cygwin folder. We extracted the .text
section from the executable file. We determined the assembly instructions using collected
statistical data, opcode of known instructions and dynamic programming. We also
determined that our algorithm is much faster than OllyDbg. The time taken by our
algorithm linearly increases with the size of the file. Moreover the accuracy of our algorithm
is 83.75% when compared to that of OllyDbg.

We used the 14 most commonly occurring instructions to generate a 2x2 table. This table is
used in the algorithm to score and find the best path and ultimately the instructions. This
can be extended to include all the instructions documented in Intel® 64 and IA-32
Architectures Software Developer's Manual. This can speed up the algorithm and improve
the accuracy of instructions. Moreover, for our experiment we only extracted the .text
section, which holds the program code of an executable file. It can be expanded to include
the .data section, which holds variables.
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11. Appendix
11.1. Appendix A: Table Containing Count for Pair of Instructions
MOV
MOV 1344183
NOP 7582
CAL 171233
LEA
100565
PUS 82778
POP 6281
JMP 79697
TES
25762
SUB 76733
CMP 20877
JE
112722
JNZ
66501
ADD 55716
RET 16894

NOP
1765
111344
2782
182
3
9
24909
41
44
278
1359
1162
257
14386

CAL
262700
262
8854
8065
11135
2
4548
1
2455
1
2192
1677
1383
1453

LEA
77861
14888
14109
31677
1941
237
23823
775
5073
1261
7614
5029
5775
21017

PUS
45236
13883
1070
37937
32341
1093
1725
98
4888
288
395
140
4713
13329

POP
37350
130
2734
4595
52
71716
250
33
203
152
1003
1211
18093
868

Table 5: Count for Pair of Instructions (Part 1)

46

TES
MOV 95626
NOP 428
CAL 34269
LEA
3175
PUS 124
POP 53
JMP 2451
TES
3
SUB 1359
CMP 4
JE
7997
JNZ
5201
ADD 4170
RET 544

SUB
63262
365
2742
6540
22292
132
2376
0
1797
12
2652
740
4539
338

CMP
80791
799
12309
10575
70
62
8442
6
9970
113
22705
7248
10677
1578

JE
23981
141
0
711
39
324
14
86572
177
64708
66
20
474
20

JNZ
9410
77
3
483
6
28
17
55127
88
34448
35
16
205
9

ADD
68926
5201
15469
5555
1555
1256
2235
142
2796
226
3806
3002
40876
892

Table 6: Count for Pair of Instructions (Part 2)
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RET
4346
27
55
151
44
52414
2
3
130
0
3
2
1631
2

11.2. Appendix B: Table Containing Log Odds for Pair of Instructions

MOV
NOP
CAL
LEA
PUS
POP
JMP
TES
SUB
CMP
JE
JNZ
ADD
RET

MOV
-0.75129151904491
-6.31370334102804
-3.15657475640606
-3.70621233369479
-3.90519066249299
-6.50226191064342
-3.94387026752639
-5.08622722384502
-3.98249059036235
-5.29765110067038
-3.58911734477546
-4.12808783307532
-4.30764733228578
-5.51029474695566

NOP
-7.77271836370932
-3.60175507122273
-7.31745631062545
-10.0449952229882
-14.1504323074871
-13.0518185880298
-5.12010322450171
-11.5354634677517
-11.4648451851369
-9.62135790252502
-8.03421677159556
-8.19087023996975
-9.69990793939476
-5.67159807274295

CAL
-2.7055845321917
-9.68063832813251
-6.15830710134644
-6.25183125290145
-5.9285378978875
-14.5558976540599
-6.82551733151786
-15.2490450730844
-7.44257766949879
-15.2490450730844
-7.55595281259616
-7.82388356474672
-8.01670512906182
-7.96731309899371

LEA
-3.96762322902811
-5.63717793636319
-5.69110697241581
-4.87811665180808
-7.67762376159906
-9.78092865272613
-5.16494139387068
-8.59599745511516
-6.71614721117076
-8.10908422660714
-6.30948405544621
-6.72486891765747
-6.58637369445226
-5.29093398852419

PUS
-4.51855101818601
-5.70730886744794
-8.27337619450129
-4.69627534578186
-4.85721218381966
-8.25210314768194
-7.7956515461628
-10.6640544630826
-6.75334051627934
-9.5860161512736
-9.270065348727
-10.30736950335
-6.78984086932419
-5.74816436425196

POP
-4.71201056995588
-10.3814798602256
-7.33487211965479
-6.81522493153474
-11.2977891927358
-4.05132651314344
-9.72752477578027
-11.7525298807225
-9.93579092303844
-10.2251285434391
-8.33805531506799
-8.14955474576016
-5.44144103643568
-8.4826465882627

JMP
-4.00039294771691
-7.1839649844503
-5.2063471980019
-7.45117344685566
-9.97599925132316
-6.34879577748766
-8.21262564687862
-9.06684498134488
-8.47118932414622
-7.3095741852385
-7.10412547764447
-6.35911103163553
-5.95056867787705
-8.03127679988243

Table 7: Log Odds for Pair of Instructions (Part 1)

MOV
NOP
CAL
LEA
PUS
POP
JMP
TES
SUB
CMP
JE
JNZ
ADD
RET

TES
-3.7577778558957
-9.18982004794497
-4.79884336326152
-7.18522498861558
-10.4287341759066
-11.2787407592976
-7.44420928061565
-14.1504323074871
-8.03421677159556
-13.8627499965706
-6.26031473983025
-6.69119809406928
-6.9123791049777
-8.94996633158059

SUB
-4.17880451001309
-9.34906091462947
-7.3319483678539
-6.46179209177736
-5.23173213242814
-10.3662119111509
-7.4753048787993
0
-7.75474281218635
-12.7641358001827
-7.36534335228878
-8.64221864603631
-6.82750033244031
-9.42591881181064

CMP
-3.92997066867103
-8.56549381447954
-5.82801975437029
-5.98027236036451
-11.0005333768441
-11.1218961415945
-6.20605563870583
-13.4572844115328
-6.03932912663443
-10.5216305459831
-5.21327582050379
-6.35883457761307
-5.97064880492973
-7.88475544231717

JE
-5.1582931509265
-10.3002517971086
0
-8.68220331909892
-11.5854743652599
-9.46822453026811
-12.6099846434249
-3.85945317114158
-10.0728533698648
-4.15585433894936
-11.0593748307406
-12.2533082686933
-9.08772495128403
-12.2533082686933

JNZ
-6.09727060642954
-10.9052215277589
-14.1504323074871
-9.06891347290096
-13.4572844115328
-11.916834124345
-12.4158279135878
-4.31841741355554
-10.7716875119731
-4.79359054029018
-11.6936889037666
-12.4764527738696
-9.92598644598958
-13.0518185880298

ADD
-4.09168358558255
-6.69119809406928
-5.59875638326331
-6.62526606092949
-7.89944360584315
-8.11305840822444
-7.53651569422682
-10.2931843914129
-7.31243323903005
-9.82845641784348
-7.00380325562496
-7.24129517251662
-4.620951645574
-8.45536644599337

Table 8: Log Odds for Pair of Instructions (Part 2)

48

RET
-6.87099724654045
-11.953202006982
-11.2416990106821
-10.2317294659436
-11.4648451851369
-4.36953865411523
-14.5558976540599
-14.1504323074871
-10.3814798602256
0
-14.1504323074871
-14.5558976540599
-7.85170769764496
-14.5558976540599

11.3. Appendix C: Chi-square Distribution Table

Table 9: Chi-square Distribution Table
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